[eng] Evolutionary Game Theory simulates collective behaviors to explain the emergence of
cooperation from self-interest decisions. Our aim in this thesis is to analyze if uniformity and
moderation into the payoff matrices drives to the emergence of higher solidarity, as we have
insistently been said by monotheisms, nationalisms and ideologies commissioners; or either
diversity, multiculturalism, persistent discussions, even polarized, about the variability in “value
scales”, about the different point of views and perspectives, as in modern democratic societies,
improves the emergence of altruism.
To do so, we will simulate collectives as networks of individuals playing evolutionary games,
where they can choose to collaborate or defect, under different parametrizations of the payoff
matrices, in addition, to see if diversity of criteria, drives to the emergence of higher
collaboration rates in the systems, we include in our numerical model different behavioral
phenotypes observed in experiments with human subjects. We conclude as a clear trend that
single thought, homogeneity in values and point of views, border lines and closeness, brings
normalized societies to lower altruism levels.