Imperfect collusion in an asymmetric duopoly

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dc.contributor.author Escrihuela, Marc
dc.contributor.author Gutiérrez Carlos
dc.date.accessioned 2020-04-21T06:17:35Z
dc.date.available 2020-04-21T06:17:35Z
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/11201/152052
dc.description.abstract [eng] Using the coefficient of cooperation, we analyse the effect of cost asymmetries on collusive agreements when firms are able to coordinate on distinct output levels than the unrestricted joint profit maximization outcome. In this context, we first investigate the extent to which collusive agreements are feasible. Secondly, we focus on collusion sustainability in an infinitely repeated game. We show that, regardless of the degree of cost asymmetry, at least some collusion is always sustainable. Finally, the degree of collusion is also endogeneised to show that cooperation has an upper bound determined by the most inefficient firm.
dc.format application/pdf
dc.relation.isformatof https://estudiosdeeconomia.uchile.cl/index.php/EDE/article/view/49264
dc.relation.ispartof Estudios de Economia, 2018, vol. 45, num. 1, p. 29-50
dc.rights , 2018
dc.subject.classification 33 - Economia
dc.subject.other 33 - Economics. Economic science
dc.title Imperfect collusion in an asymmetric duopoly
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.date.updated 2020-04-21T06:17:35Z
dc.subject.keywords Imperfect collusion
dc.subject.keywords cost asymmetries
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess


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