Structural Holes in Social Networks with Exogenous Cliques

Show simple item record Rubí-Barceló, Antoni 2021-09-28T05:59:40Z 2021-09-28T05:59:40Z
dc.description.abstract [eng] It has been empirically shown that structural holes in social networks enable potential large benefits to those individuals who bridge them (Burt, 2004). The work in Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2007) shows that the large payoff differentials caused by structural holes can persist even when agents strategically add and remove ties to smooth those differentials, thereby providing a game-theoretic rationale for the existence of bridge-agents. The present paper ties back to the initial empirical literature by explicitly assuming that agents are exogenously linked forming cliques, as in a firm environment. In this setting, bridge-agents cannot be sustained under the same conditions of Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2007). Instead, they can be sustained when the deviation possibilities are restricted and only when they connect small groups of agents to the rest.
dc.format application/pdf
dc.relation.ispartof Games, 2017, vol. 8, num. 32, p. 1-13
dc.rights , 2017
dc.subject.classification 33 - Economia
dc.subject.other 33 - Economics. Economic science
dc.title Structural Holes in Social Networks with Exogenous Cliques
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article 2021-09-28T05:59:41Z
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

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