Categorical Segregation from a game theoretical approach

dc.contributor.author	Rubí-Barceló, Antoni
dc.date.accessioned	2021-09-28T06:13:11Z
dc.date.available	2021-09-28T06:13:11Z
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/11201/155729
dc.description.abstract	[eng] This paper exploits a coalition formation game with incomplete information to illustrate the causal relationship between categorical thinking and segregation. This causality was suggested by Fryer and Jackson (2008). The present model shows how societies can be segregated even when its self-interested members have no a priori motivation to discriminate by social identity; consequently, this paper supports the argument that segregation may not be malevolent in origin.
dc.format	application/pdf
dc.relation.isformatof	http://aeconf.com/may2013.htm
dc.relation.ispartof	Annals Of Economics And Finance, 2013, vol. 14, num. 1, p. 111-128
dc.rights	, 2013
dc.subject.classification	33 - Economia
dc.subject.other	33 - Economics. Economic science
dc.title	Categorical Segregation from a game theoretical approach
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.date.updated	2021-09-28T06:13:11Z
dc.rights.accessRights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess