Categorical Segregation from a game theoretical approach

Show simple item record Rubí-Barceló, Antoni 2021-09-28T06:13:11Z 2021-09-28T06:13:11Z
dc.description.abstract [eng] This paper exploits a coalition formation game with incomplete information to illustrate the causal relationship between categorical thinking and segregation. This causality was suggested by Fryer and Jackson (2008). The present model shows how societies can be segregated even when its self-interested members have no a priori motivation to discriminate by social identity; consequently, this paper supports the argument that segregation may not be malevolent in origin.
dc.format application/pdf
dc.relation.ispartof Annals Of Economics And Finance, 2013, vol. 14, num. 1, p. 111-128
dc.rights , 2013
dc.subject.classification 33 - Economia
dc.subject.other 33 - Economics. Economic science
dc.title Categorical Segregation from a game theoretical approach
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article 2021-09-28T06:13:11Z
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

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