Investments and bargaining in a model with positive consumption externalities

Show simple item record Cardona, Daniel Rubí-Barceló, Antoni 2021-09-28T06:27:16Z
dc.description.abstract [eng] This paper analyzes the investment decisions of the members of a committee when a subsequent bargaining process determines the distribution of a divisible good among them. The shares allocated to investing agents generate positive consumption externalities. We show that agents' investments improve their bargaining position. This induces rent-seeking behavior that generates a negative external effect on other investing agents. In this setting, the effects of rent-seeking counterbalance the effects of positive consumption externalities so that equilibria may be efficient or display either over- or under-investment.
dc.format application/pdf
dc.relation.isformatof Versió postprint del document publicat a:
dc.relation.ispartof Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2014, vol. 108, p. 78-93
dc.subject.classification 33 - Economia
dc.subject.other 33 - Economics. Economic science
dc.title Investments and bargaining in a model with positive consumption externalities
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion 2021-09-28T06:27:17Z info:eu-repo/date/embargoEnd/2026-12-31
dc.embargo 2026-12-31
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/embargoedAccess

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