Group-contests with endogenous claims

Show simple item record Cardona, Daniel Rubí-Barceló, Antoni 2021-09-28T06:36:39Z
dc.description.abstract [eng] Before group members individually decide their efforts in a contest to set a policy, groups are allowed to make some concessions to their opponent by choosing a less controversial policy to lobby for. When valuations over the set of policies follow a linear function, we show that concessions are never profitable when the contest success function is homogeneous of degree zero but they are when it is of difference form. Surprisingly, concessions might be detrimental for the members of the group that does not make them. Comparing this situation with another where efforts are decided collectively at a group level allows us to identify the effect of positive externalities of effort as the key cause of this damage.
dc.format application/pdf
dc.relation.ispartof European Journal Of Political Economy, 2016, vol. 44, p. 97-111
dc.rights , 2016
dc.subject.classification 33 - Economia
dc.subject.other 33 - Economics. Economic science
dc.title Group-contests with endogenous claims
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article 2021-09-28T06:36:40Z info:eu-repo/date/embargoEnd/2026-12-31
dc.embargo 2026-12-31
dc.subject.keywords Contests
dc.subject.keywords one-dimensional policies
dc.subject.keywords Strategic restraint
dc.subject.keywords Nash equilibrium
dc.subject.keywords Groups
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/embargoedAccess

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