Investments, Positive Externalities, and Majority Bargaining

Show simple item record Cardona, Daniel Rubí-Barceló, Antoni 2021-09-28T06:42:59Z 2021-09-28T06:42:59Z
dc.description.abstract [eng] This study analyzes the welfare implications of requiring either unanimity or a simple majority in negotiations to distribute a budget among three agents who could previously invest to generate positive consumption externalities for others. This complements Cardona and Rubí-Barceló (2014), who consider only the unanimity case. We show that reducing the majority requirement reduces the profitability of investments, and consequently alleviates overinvestment, which is predominant under unanimous bargaining. Nevertheless, requiring a simple majority reduces the aggregate surplus attained in the bargaining stage. Therefore, the relative performance of the bargaining rules is uncertain. We show how the size of consumption externalities affects this performance.
dc.format application/pdf
dc.relation.ispartof Journal Of Institutional And Theoretical Economics-Zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 2019, vol. 175, num. 4, p. 664-691
dc.rights , 2019
dc.subject.classification 33 - Economia
dc.subject.other 33 - Economics. Economic science
dc.title Investments, Positive Externalities, and Majority Bargaining
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article 2021-09-28T06:42:59Z
dc.subject.keywords Investments
dc.subject.keywords Holdup
dc.subject.keywords Multilateral bargaining
dc.subject.keywords Majority Rule
dc.subject.keywords Externalities
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

Files in this item

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record

Search Repository

Advanced Search


My Account