On the efficiency of equilibria in a legislative bargaining model with particularistic and collective goods

Show simple item record

dc.contributor.author Cardona, Daniel
dc.contributor.author Rubí-Barceló, Antoni
dc.date.accessioned 2021-09-28T06:51:02Z
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/11201/155737
dc.description.abstract [eng] This study analyzes the efficiency of equilibria in a multilateral bargaining game in which a legislature divides its budget among collective and particularistic goods. In order to disentangle the causes of inefficiency, we extend the model of Volden and Wiseman (Am Polit Sci Rev 101:79 92, 2007) by considering quasi-linear utility functions, and consensus requirements ranging from simple majority to unanimity. Although unanimous agreements can be reached under weaker consensus requirements, we show that (Pareto) inefficiency is associated with non-unanimous consent. We also study how (i) the endogenous selection of the legislature's size or (ii) a sequential choice of collective and particularistic spending eliminates or attenuates the inefficiency problem.
dc.format application/pdf
dc.relation.isformatof Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-014-0204-0
dc.relation.ispartof Public Choice, 2014, vol. 161, p. 345-366
dc.subject.classification 33 - Economia
dc.subject.other 33 - Economics. Economic science
dc.title On the efficiency of equilibria in a legislative bargaining model with particularistic and collective goods
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
dc.date.updated 2021-09-28T06:51:02Z
dc.date.embargoEndDate info:eu-repo/date/embargoEnd/2026-12-31
dc.embargo 2026-12-31
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/embargoedAccess
dc.identifier.doi https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-014-0204-0


Files in this item

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record

Search Repository


Advanced Search

Browse

My Account

Statistics