Optimal board independence with gray independent directors

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dc.contributor.author Pascual Fuster, Bartolomé
dc.contributor.author Crespí Cladera, Rafel
dc.date.accessioned 2023-03-14T08:01:59Z
dc.date.available 2023-03-14T08:01:59Z
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/11201/160284
dc.description.abstract [eng] Based on the optimal board independence theory, we analyze how Spanish listed firms determine the presence of genuine and gray independent directors. We classify independents as gray whenever they do not satisfy formal independence requirements. Given the findings in previous literature, this type of gray independent does not promote poor corporate governance practices. Our results suggest that the presence of gray and genuine independent directors is related to the optimal board independence determinants as if both provided real board independence. Results are not affected by the number and the type of unsatisfied independence criteria, nor by the firm's achievement of regulators' recommended level of board independence. Therefore, we conclude that firms pay little attention to formal independence requirements to reach their optimal board structure.
dc.format application/pdf
dc.relation.isformatof https://doi.org/10.1177/2340944420940313
dc.relation.ispartof Brq-Business Research Quarterly, 2022, vol. 25, num. 2, p. 193-209
dc.rights , 2022
dc.subject.classification 33 - Economia
dc.subject.other 33 - Economics. Economic science
dc.title Optimal board independence with gray independent directors
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.date.updated 2023-03-14T08:01:59Z
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.identifier.doi https://doi.org/10.1177/2340944420940313

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