Environmental policy contests: command and control versus taxes

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dc.contributor.author Cardona, Daniel
dc.contributor.author De Freitas, Jenny C.
dc.contributor.author Rubí-Barceló, Antoni
dc.date.accessioned 2023-07-26T08:26:44Z
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/11201/161332
dc.description.abstract [eng] This study compares the performance of two types of environmental policy instruments (command and control and taxes on emissions) when (1) the regulator's policy choice is sensitive to the pressure of two lobbies (environmentalist and industry) and (2) lobbies can strategically set the policy proposal they will lobby for. Due to the extra fiscal burden entailed by taxes, we find that lobbyists have more incentives to moderate their policy proposals under command and control. We show how this triggers a series of differences between these two regulatory tools in terms of expected emissions, lobbyists' utilities, or aggregate welfare.
dc.format application/pdf
dc.relation.isformatof Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-020-09631-4
dc.relation.ispartof International Tax and Public Finance, 2021, vol. 28, p. 654-684
dc.subject.classification 33 - Economia
dc.subject.other 33 - Economics. Economic science
dc.title Environmental policy contests: command and control versus taxes
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
dc.date.updated 2023-07-26T08:26:45Z
dc.date.embargoEndDate info:eu-repo/date/embargoEnd/2100-01-01
dc.embargo 2100-01-01
dc.subject.keywords Environmental regulation
dc.subject.keywords Taxation
dc.subject.keywords command and control
dc.subject.keywords Lobbying
dc.subject.keywords Contests
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/embargoedAccess
dc.identifier.doi https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-020-09631-4

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