Lobbying policy makers: Share versus lottery contests

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dc.contributor.author Cardona, Daniel
dc.contributor.author De Freitas, Jenny C.
dc.contributor.author Rubí-Barceló, Antoni
dc.date.accessioned 2023-08-01T07:34:27Z
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/11201/161377
dc.description.abstract [eng] In lobbying competition to influence a policy ranging over a continuum, lottery and share contests can be regarded as two alternative conflict resolution protocols. In the lottery contest, the policy is selected probabilistically whereas in the share contest the policy choice is deterministic. Although these two contest settings are equivalent for risk-neutral lobbyists, this equivalence fails to hold when they are risk-averse. We demonstrate that when lobbyists have concave preferences over policies and select their policy proposals, they strategically moderate their claims only under the (probabilistic) lottery setting. This action defuses the conflict and reduces the exerted effort. Consequently, risk-averse contestants might unanimously prefer the lottery to the share contest.
dc.format application/pdf
dc.relation.isformatof https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12601
dc.relation.ispartof Journal Of Public Economic Theory, 2022, vol. 24, num. 4, p. 709-732
dc.rights , 2022
dc.subject.classification 33 - Economia
dc.subject.other 33 - Economics. Economic science
dc.title Lobbying policy makers: Share versus lottery contests
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.date.updated 2023-08-01T07:34:28Z
dc.date.embargoEndDate info:eu-repo/date/embargoEnd/2100-01-01
dc.embargo 2100-01-01
dc.subject.keywords share contest
dc.subject.keywords endogenous policy
dc.subject.keywords risk aversion
dc.subject.keywords Lobbying
dc.subject.keywords Contests
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/embargoedAccess
dc.identifier.doi https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12601

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