[eng] Relations between disgust and evaluative judgments are widely presented with an amplification
effect (scope of evaluations). Conversely, it is also presented a widespread view, predicting
extremity in many affective states (scope of emotions). This study examined if multiple moral
and aesthetic sensitivities could be included in one or both hypotheses. Further, it is tested if
non-moral, moral, and aesthetic judgments could be involved in these scopes. We developed
particular and general judgment and sensitivity constructs in order to corroborate these
approaches. It is presented evidence against the scope of evaluations, arguing that it remains
unclear the existence of this amplifying effect between disgust across several judgments and
sensitivities. This study indicates less consistent relations on the scope of emotions in
comparison with previous research. Furthermore, it is express that general measures permit to
comment more adequately global relations among morals, non-moral actions, aesthetics, and
negative emotions.