Examining the Scopes of Evaluations and Emotions with Particular and General Sensitivity Constructs for Morals, Aesthetics, and Negative Emotions. New Approach on Landy & Piazza (2017)

Abstract

[eng] Relations between disgust and evaluative judgments are widely presented with an amplification effect (scope of evaluations). Conversely, it is also presented a widespread view, predicting extremity in many affective states (scope of emotions). This study examined if multiple moral and aesthetic sensitivities could be included in one or both hypotheses. Further, it is tested if non-moral, moral, and aesthetic judgments could be involved in these scopes. We developed particular and general judgment and sensitivity constructs in order to corroborate these approaches. It is presented evidence against the scope of evaluations, arguing that it remains unclear the existence of this amplifying effect between disgust across several judgments and sensitivities. This study indicates less consistent relations on the scope of emotions in comparison with previous research. Furthermore, it is express that general measures permit to comment more adequately global relations among morals, non-moral actions, aesthetics, and negative emotions.