Infants' performance in the indirect false belief tasks: A second-person interpretation

Abstract

Research in the last 15 years has challenged the idea that false belief attributiondevelops at 4 years of age. Studies with indirect false belief tasks contend to provideevidence of false belief attribution in the second year of life. We review the literatureon indirect false belief tasks carried out in infants using looking and active helpingparadigms. Although the results are heterogeneous and not conclusive, such tasksappear to capture a real effect. However, it is misleading to call them'false belief'tasks, as it is possible to pass them without making any false belief attribution.Infants need to keep track of the object's and agent's positions, trajectories, andfocus of attention, given an intentional understanding of the agent, to pass thesenew tasks. We, therefore, argue that the evidence can be better explained in termsof second-person attributions, which are transparent, extensional, nonpropositional,reciprocally contingent, and implicit. Second-person attributions can also accountfor primates' mentalizing abilities, as revealed by similar indirect tasks.