A conceptual replication of an interactive false-belief task in young children

dc.contributor.author	Barone, Pamela
dc.contributor.author	Giorgetti, D.
dc.contributor.author	Isern-Mas, Carme
dc.contributor.author	López Navarro, E.
dc.contributor.editor	Thomson Reuters, 2022	ca
dc.date	2022
dc.date.accessioned	2024-02-05T11:56:00Z
dc.date.available	2024-02-05T11:56:00Z
dc.date.issued	2024-02-05
dc.identifier.isbn	9788413908748	ca
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/11201/164521
dc.description.abstract	[eng] Theory of mind, the ability to attribute mental states to others to predict or explain their behaviour, fully develops by the age of four when children consistently pass explicit false-belief tasks (Wellman et al., 2001). However, several implicit measures of falsebelief understanding, like looking behaviour and interactiva responses, indicate that infants show an early competence to attribute false beliefs (Baillargeon et al., 2010; Buttelmann et al., 2014; Senju et al., 2011).	ca
dc.format	application/pdf
dc.language.iso	eng	ca
dc.relation.ispartof	G. Buela-Casal (Ed.), International Handbook of Clinical Psychology (Vol. 1).
dc.subject	159.9 - Psicologia	ca
dc.title	A conceptual replication of an interactive false-belief task in young children	ca
dc.type	Book chapter	ca
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics//Book chapter
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion