A Second-Personal Approach to the Evolution of Moral Motivation and the Feeling of Obligaton

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dc.contributor.author Carme Isern-Mas
dc.contributor.author Antoni Gomila
dc.date.accessioned 2025-01-27T13:25:55Z
dc.date.available 2025-01-27T13:25:55Z
dc.identifier.citation Isern-Mas, C., Gomila, A. (2022). A Second-Personal Approach to the Evolution of Morality. Biol Theory 17, 199–209
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/11201/168018
dc.description.abstract [eng] Building on the discussion between Stephen Darwall and Michael Tomassello, we propose an alternative evolutionary account of moral motivation in its two-pronged dimension. We argue that an evolutionary account of moral motivation must account for the two forms of moral motivation that we distinguish: motivation to be partial, which is triggered by the affective relationships we develop with others; and motivation to be impartial, which is triggered by those norms to which we give impartial validity. To that aim, we present the second-person standpoint of morality, first as Darwall conceives of it, and then as we reinterpret it from a naturalistic approach. Then we synthesize Tomasello’s evolutionary account of morality, and Darwall’s objections to it. To reply to those objections, building on Tomasello’s proposal, we argue that the motivation to be impartial, and the feeling of obligation to comply with normative requirements, appeared when humans anticipated and, critically, internalized others’ sanctions to the violation of social norms. Consequently, we posit that social norms and sanctions appeared first at the community level, and only after that were they internalized in the form of selfdirected reactive attitudes. Finally, we derive some corollaries that follow from our proposal.
dc.format application/pdf
dc.format.extent 199-209
dc.publisher Springer
dc.relation.ispartof Biological Theory, 2022, vol. 17, p. 199-209
dc.rights Attribution 4.0 International
dc.rights.uri https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.subject.classification 14 - Sistemes i punts de vista filosòfics
dc.subject.classification 17 - Ètica. Filosofia pràctica
dc.subject.other 14 - Philosophical systems and points of view
dc.subject.other 17 - Moral philosophy. Ethics. Practical philosophy
dc.title A Second-Personal Approach to the Evolution of Moral Motivation and the Feeling of Obligaton
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type Article
dc.date.updated 2025-01-27T13:25:56Z
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.identifier.doi https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-022-00397-y


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